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Janofsky: Search and Seizure

SEARCH AND SEIZURE
United States ConstitutionAmendment IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their person,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrantsshall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
New York ConstitutionArticle I, Section 12:
The right of the people to be secure in their person,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularlydescribing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Robinson'
(decided December 18, 2001)
Frank Robinson was convicted of criminal possession of a
weapon in the third degree and the unlawful wearing of a bulletproof vest. Robinson was sentenced as a persistent felon to eight
years to life on the weapons charge and one and one-half to three
years on the other. Robinson appealed his conviction based on the
constitutional safeguard set forth in the Search and Seizure Clause
2

. 97 N.Y.2d 341, 767 N.E.2d 638, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147 (2001).
Id. at 346.
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of both the Federal 3 and New York State 4 Constitutions. He
argued that the officer's primary motivation in stopping the vehicle
was to conduct some other investigation other than a valid traffic
infraction.5 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the lower court and held that a vehicular stop by police was
lawful where the officer had probable cause to believe that the
driver committed a traffic violation. 6 In coming to this conclusion,
the court stated that, "In making the determination of probable
cause, neither the primary motivation of the officer nor a
determination of what a reasonable traffic officer would have done
under the circumstances is relevant."'
Two police officers in the Bronx were following taxicabs in
an attempt to prevent robberies.8 They pulled over a speeding car,
which they suspected to be a livery cab. 9 The officers had planned
on talking to the driver about safety tips rather than issuing a
summons.'0 However, the police officers became suspicious when
one of them observed the defendant repeatedly turn to glance at the
officers." One of the police officers shined his flashlight into the
rear of the cab where defendant Robinson was seated and noticed
that he was wearing a bulletproof vest.' 2 After seeing the vest, the
officer ordered the defendant out of the taxicab.' 3 The police
officer then 4noticed a gun on the floor of the cab where Robinson
was seated.'
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated... but upon
probable cause. .
4 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. This section provides in pertinent part:
"The right
of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...but upon probable
cause ......
5
Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 349.
6
id.
3

7id.

aId. at 346.

id.
'0 Robinson 97 N.Y.2d at 346-47.
1Id.
12Id. at 347.
13id.
14id.
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On appeal to the appellate division, Robinson challenged
the trial court's decision to allow the gun to be introduced into
15
evidence, arguing the gun should have been suppressed.
Robinson claimed that the cab was unconstitutionally stopped
under the pretext of a traffic violation. 6 He argued that the
officers never intended to issue a summons for a traffic violation
since the cab was stopped under the pretext of preventing criminal
activity against cab drivers by their passengers.' 7 The appellate
court upheld the lower court's decision.'"
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by discussing
Whren v. United States,'9 which articulates the federal rule for
dealing with pretextual traffic stops. In Whren, plain-clothes
officers, while patrolling a known drug area, became suspicious
after passing a truck with a temporary license plate that was
waiting at a stop sign for a long period of time with the driver
looking down. 20 After the truck made a sudden right turn and sped
off without signaling, the officers stopped the car for the traffic
violation. 2 ' As the officer approached the vehicle, he noticed two
plastic bags filled with crack cocaine in the petitioner's hands and
arrested him.22 The petitioner claimed the drugs should have been
suppressed from evidence because they were obtained through a
pretextual traffic stop.23
Temporary detention of a person during an automobile stop
constitutes a limited seizure under the provisions of the Fourth

People v. Robinson, 271 A.D.2d 17, 18, 711 N.Y.S.2d 384, 385 (lst Dep't

15

2000).

Id. "A pretext stop has generally been defined as a police officer's use of a
traffic infraction as a subterfuge to stop a motor vehicle in order to investigate
168

the driver or occupant about an unrelated matter." Id.at 18, 711 N.Y.S.2d at
386.
17 Id.
'8 1d.
19 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
20 Id. at 808.
21

Id.

22

Id. at 809.

2

Id.
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Amendment. 24 Therefore, an automobile stop must not be
•6
25
unreasonable" under any circumstances.
In Whren, the United
States Supreme Court held that "[a]s a general matter, the decision
to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable
cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred., 26 Since the
driver failed to signal before turning, the police officers had
probable cause to stop the vehicle because the traffic code was
violated. The Court rejected any effort to tie the primary
motivation in making the stop to the constitutionality of the stop,
and deemed it irrelevant whether a reasonable police officer would
have followed the same course of action.27
Therefore,
"[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis., 28 The Court's main reason for using
an objective test is that it is easier to determine the intent of an
individual officer than to decipher the collective thoughts of law
enforcement in order to determine whether
a "reasonable officer"
•
•
29
would have acted upon the traffic infraction.
The relevant parts of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and the New York State Constitution Article I
§ 12 are identical.3 ° They both provide that the "right of people to
24

Whren, 517 U.S. at 809 ("The Fourth Amendment guarantees 'the right of

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable
searches and seizures."') (citations omitted).
25
Id. at 810.
26 Id. See United States v. James Hassan El, 5 F.3d
726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993)
("When an officer observes a traffic offense, they are justified in stopping the
vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. Such a limited detention does not
become 'unreasonable merely because the officer has intuitive suspicions that
the occupants of the car are engaged in some sort of criminal activity"')
(citations omitted); see also United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500-01
(8th Cir. 1990) ("When an officer observes a traffic offense-however minor-he
has probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle ....That stop remains valid
even if the officer would have ignored the traffic violation but for his other
suspicions."); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 782 (2d Cir. 1994)
("Probable cause arises when the police reasonably believe that 'an offense has
been or is being committed. In the instant case, there was probable cause to stop
and arrest Scopo - CFSF officers directly observed him violating the traffic laws
by not signaling lane changes.") (citations omitted).
27 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
28Id. at 813.
29 Id. at 815.
30
Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 350.
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be secure in their persons.., against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated .... 31 Although their wording is
identical, there have been different interpretations of these clauses
over the years. In particular, the New York Court of Appeals has
expanded the rights of New York citizens beyond the requirements
of the Federal Constitution
when "a longstanding New York
32
involved.,
interest was
Prior to Whren, it was established precedent in New York
that a traffic violation could not be used as a pretext to investigate
a person on an entirely different matter. 33 In a situation where an
apparent traffic violation does not motivate the stop, a traffic
violation could not be used as a justification for the stop.3 In
essence, the courts looked to the subjective intent of the officers at
the time of the stop rather
than merely whether there was probable
35
cause to make the stop.
Following Whren, and until the Robinson decision, the
appellate courts of New York struggled to define the appropriate
CONST. amend. IV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 350.
33 People v. Laws, 213 A.D.2d 226, 623 N.Y.S.2d 860, 861 (1st Dep't 1995).
An officer on patrol in a known drug area noticed that defendant's car was
double-parked and bore Connecticut license plates. The officer also noticed that
the car had a broken tail-light and decided to run the plates. Thinking that
defendant was in the area to possibly buy drugs, he proceeded to pull the car
over. The court found that the traffic infraction was not the officer's reason for
pulling the car over and granted suppression of the evidence acquired during the
unwarranted stop.
34 People v. Ynoa, 223 A.D. 975, 978, 623 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890 (3rd
Dep't
1996). State Trooper on the New York State Thruway received a "be on the
lookout for" message for a grey Oldsmobile with Massachusetts' license plates
occupied by two Hispanics. Officer spotted car, noticed that one of the
headlights was out on the vehicle and therefore pulled it over. After a search of
the car, the officer found a bag containing U.S. currency and a brick of cocaine;
he subsequently arrested the defendants. The court held that "Police officers
may stop a motor vehicle where they have observed the commission of a traffic
offense in their presence; however, the violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law
cannot be a mere pretext to investigate the defendant for another unrelated
matter." Id. at 978, 636 N.Y.S.2d at 890. "The court held that since the officer
intended to intercept the car ...the stop was not motivated by the headlight
infraction
but was rather pretextual." Id.
35
People v. Washington, 238 A.D.2d 43,47, 671 N.Y.S.2d 439, 442 (1st Dep't
1998).
31 U.S.
32
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standard for deciding whether a stop of an automobile was merely
a pretext. 36 The Court of Appeals' failure to make a decision as to
whether pretext stops are in violation of the protection against
unreasonable search and seizures provided for in Article I, § 12 of
the New York State Constitution caused the individual departments
to grapple with this issue.
In order to determine whether a stop is pretextual, some
departments decided to continue applying a subjective test, where
an inquiry is made to determine the true motivation for the officer
making the stop.3 7 This led to some of the appellate courts using
various factors in determining383 a police officer's primary
motivation for a traffic stop.3 In People v. Washington,39 the court
considered factors, which led it to conclude that the officer's
primary motivation in stopping the cab was a traffic infraction and
therefore not merely pretextual.4 ° Upon witnessing a livery cab
driving erratically, the police officer followed the cab for a short
distance before stopping it for driving the wrong way on a one-way
street.4 ' The problem with the court's approach in Washington is
36

ld. at 50, 671 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
Robinson, 271 A.D.2d at 20, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 387; see People v. Califano,
225 A.D.2d 701, 680 N.Y.S.2d 700 (3d Dep't 1998); see also People v.
McGriff, 219 A.D.2d 829, 631 N.Y.S.2d 969 (4th Dep't 1995).
38 Washington, 238 A.D.2d at 50, 671 N.Y.S.2d at 444. Factors
utilized to
determine motivation of a police officer include: whether officer checked car's
registration or issued summons to driver, whether officer made inquiries
regarding alleged traffic violation beyond asking for license and registration,
whether officer's assessment included issuance of traffic summonses, whether
before the stop the officer followed the car for a significant distance or detained
defendant for an extended period of time after the stop and whether prior to the
stop the officer had already determined to stop and arrest the defendant.
39 238 A.D.2d at 43, 671 N.Y.S.2d
at 439.
40 Washington, 238 A.D.2d at 50-51, 671 N.Y.S.2d at 445' Officer pulled over
a livery cab after witnessing it was going in the wrong direction on a one-way
street. After asking the passenger to get out of cab, the officer noticed a
handgun sticking out of the back of the passenger's seat and arrested the
passenger. Id. "Clearly the officer's actions belie any intent, prior to the stop,
to pursue an investigation of defendant concerning an unrelated robbery
regardless of the traffic infraction." The court held that the mere failure of the
officer to issue a traffic summons will not warrant a finding that a stop was
pretextual. Id.
37

41id.
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that it is extremely difficult to establish the subjective intent of a
police officer through the available means.42
In People v. Robinson,43 the New York Court of Appeals
handed down a landmark decision. The court finally established a
uniform standard to be used in New York to determine whether
pretext stops are in violation of the protection against unreasonable
search and seizures articulated in Article I, § 12 of the New York
In light of the difficulties involved in
State Constitution."
determining the subjective motivation of police officers, the court
held that the primary motivation test is not the best possible test
and therefore is "not part of our State constitutional
jurisprudence., 45 As a result, the court decided to adopt the Whren
decision as a matter of state law.4 The court held that "where a
police officer has probable cause to believe that the driver of an
automobile has committed a traffic violation, a stop does not
violate Article I, § 12 of the New York State Constitution. 47
Neither the primary motivation of the officer nor a determination
of how a reasonable officer under the same conditions would have
acted is relevant in making a determination of probable cause."
Therefore, an officer who can explain credible facts establishing a
reasonable basis that a person has violated a traffic law has
"established a reasonable basis to effectuate a stop." 49
The New York Court of Appeals hotly debated the issue
prior to reaching its conclusion in People v. Robinson.50 The
42

Robinson, 271 A.D.2d at 20,711 N.Y.S.2d at 387 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at
814).
N.Y.2d at 341.
"N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 12.
45
497

Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 350.

46Id.

at 346.

Id. at 349 (The officers observed a livery cab speed through a red light and
pulled it over, therefore establishing probable cause that a traffic violation had
occurred).
" Id. (The Court stated "where the police have stopped a vehicle for a valid
reason, we have upheld police conduct without regard to the reason for the
stop,") (citing People v. David L., 81 A.D.2d 893, rev'd, 56 N.Y.2d 698, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 866 (1982)).
49 Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 353.
so See id. (Opinion by Judge Smith in which Judges Wesley, Rosenblatt, and
Graffeo concur; Judge Levine dissents in which Chief Justice Kaye and Judge
47

Ciparick concur).
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dissenters of the divided court wrote a compelling dissent. They
believed the existence of probable cause that an infraction was
committed is insufficient to protect against arbitrary conduct of
police officers. 5 Further, they felt that the probable cause standard
advocated in Whren does not demonstrate that it adequately
protects the "constitutional rights of motorists on highways from
arbitrarily exercised police powers to seize and search. 52 The
majority rebutted this argument and concluded that probable cause
stops are based on violations of the law rather than on the
discretion of police officers. 3 In actuality, the adopted standard
constrains police conduct to "probable cause under the Vehicle and
Traffic Law and its related regulations that govern the safe use of
our highways.54 In essence, violation of a statute triggers the
authority of an officer to make the stop while at the same time
limiting his discretion. 5
The dissenters believed that the court should have adopted
an objective standard that would require a determination of
"whether a reasonable officer assigned to Vehicle and Traffic Law
enforcement in the seizing officer's department have made the stop
under the circumstances presented, absent a purpose to investigate
serious criminal activity of the vehicle's occupants. 56 This
standard would make it highly relevant that the stop be carried out57
according to the ordinary procedures of their department.
Against this, the majority argued that the "reasonable officer"
standard would result in inappropriate selective enforcement of
traffic laws in accordance with the justice's beliefs in Whren.5
They enhanced their beliefs by noting that no state court employs
59
the "reasonable police officer" test advocated by the dissenters.

51Id. at

360 (Levine, J., dissenting).

52 id.

53

Id. at 356.

54

Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 358.

55

id.

6 Id.
57Id.
58

59

at 371-72.
at 372.

Id. at 357-58.
Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 349.
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In fact, more than forty states have adopted the objective standard
adopted by Whren.6°
In conclusion, after the decision in People v. Robinson,
federal and state law is identical with respect to their treatment of
both the federal and state Search and Seizure Clauses. The Fourth
Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Whren v.
United States, is not violated by a seizure where a police officer
has probable cause to detain someone for a traffic violation. 6,
Therefore, the subjective intentions of a police officer in making a
traffic stop plays no role in probable cause Fourth Amendment
analysis.62 In People v. Robinson, the Court of Appeals of New
York decided to adopt the Whren standard as a matter of state
law.63 Therefore, in New York, as long as a police officer has
observed a traffic violation, probable cause is established to pull
someone over no matter how trivial the infraction may be and no
matter what police officer's actual motivation was in stopping the
individual.
JonathanJanofsky

6Id. at
61

6d.

357.

Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
at 813.

63Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 346.
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